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This paper examines the related problems of the capitalization and financial performance of the railway companies in the interwar period. It examines the critics' view that the railways were over-capitalized, and places the debate in context by analyzing the dividend and accounting policies of the companies and the consequences for investment. It also examines the conflicting views of railway management and shareholders over capital expenditure. The paper concludes that the railways were both financially over-capitalized and physically under-capitalized, and so faced very serious financial problems



































After the Railways Act of 1921, Britain's four main line 

companies [London Midland and Scottish Railway (LMSR), London 

and North Eastern Railway (LNER), Great Western Railway (GWR) 

and Southern Railway (SR)], formed a system which was unusual in 

international terms in that it was still privately owned and not 

dependent on public subsidy. In 1929, the railways reached their 

interwar peak in terms of net revenue earned.  In that year, 

gross railway receipts amounted to £195 million, and net revenue 

reached over £44 million. The railways' accumulated capital 

expenditure was an impressive £1,200 million, which financed a 

wide range of assets operated by 642,000 employees. The 

companies carried 1,237 million passengers and over 300 million 

tons of goods by rail, and operated 80,000 tons of steamships. 

The railway companies also owned 1,000 miles of canals, held 

35,000 acres of non-railway land and owned 56,000 houses 

(Railway Returns, 1929: 6; Fox, 1932 : 1).  This 'strength' was 

more apparent than real, however, as there were fundamental 

weaknesses in the capital structure and financial performance of 

the railway companies. Railway profitability was weak, and never 

reached the 'standard revenue' (net revenue) of £51 million 

defined under the terms of the 1921 Act in either of the 

interwar peak years of 1929 or 1937. In the 1930s, it became 

obvious that there had been a major loss of market share, 

especially in freight, to road competition. Ordinary 

shareholders often went without dividends and trade unions 

complained of pay cuts and deteriorating working conditions for 

their members. There was a serious shortage of resources for 

investment, especially in electrification, in which only one of 

the four companies, SR, had a good record of innovation. These 

weaknesses, and the debates over railway capitalization which 

they provoked, form the focus of this article.
	
	The paper argues that the railways were financially over-

capitalized in the interwar period because of the decline in 

their earning capacity. This decline meant that railway 

companies had increasing difficulty in financing dividends and 

interest payments; in particular, the ordinary shareholders 

suffered from declining dividend payments in the 1930s. The 

Economist (1931) argued that this meant ordinary shareholders 

had 'an awkward fence to cross'. The 'fence' not only related to 

the ordinary shareholders, however, but is broadly applied in 

the paper to the problems represented by the capital structure, 

which became a formidable barrier to the railway companies.  
	
	The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. 

The next section discusses whether railway capital was, as some 

critics asserted, 'watered'. It is followed by an examination of 

the railways' regulatory and competitive environment. The next 

part then analyzes the railway companies' 'up-to-the-hilt' 

dividend policy employed in the interwar years. There follows an 

exploration of accounting practices followed by the railway 

companies which exacerbated their financial position. Attention 

is then focused on the investment performance of the companies. 

Next, there is an examination of the conflicting views of 

management and shareholders over capital expenditure, and the 

attempts of railway directors to resolve the conflicts. The 

penultimate section focuses on the fundamental decline in 














































Was railway capital 'watered' ?


The financial weakness of the railways in the interwar period 

led to the charge of over-capitalization being brought against 

the companies by elements of the labour movement, especially 

those associated with the left-wing Labour Research Department, 

and also various contributors to the financial and trade press

(The Economist, The Accountant, Modern Transport). Labour 

critics usually complained of the large amount of 'water' 

allegedly contained in railway capital. In a 1930s monograph, 

for example, Fox estimated that the amount of 'water' was around 

18% of the total railway capital i.e. £224 million (1932: 6). 

'Water' had two meanings: shares which had not been genuinely 

subscribed (i.e. 'nominal additions' to capital) and share 

capital which had been used for illegitimate or unproductive 

purposes. The second was more important and derived from 

excessive expenditure on parliamentary and legal expenses, on 

the purchase of land and on the acquisition of canals in order 

to eliminate competition. 

These charges, made in a critical article by 'A Student

of Economics' (Modern Transport, 1935) provoked robust responses 

from senior railway managers and directors. Accusations of 

excessive 'nominal additions' to capital, were relatively easily 

answered, as nearly all the capital had actually been 

subscribed. There was more substance, however, in the charge 

that the original costs of land purchase, construction and 

parliamentary approval had been 'grossly inflated' (Crompton, 

1995: 135). Irving has shown that the railways were over-

capitalized for such reasons in 1914, arguing that capital 

accounts were 'seriously burdened in this respect'(1984: 18). 

Even Wood, LMSR Vice President, while disputing the term 

'water', conceded that 'such penalties on railway construction 

...are real and affected (and in part still affect) the yield on 

the capital invested' (Modern Transport, 1935).    

	While there is evidence to support the view that the 

railways were over-capitalized because of their inflated 

construction costs, a more fruitful area for analysis is 

the financial performance of the railway companies in the 1920s 






































The 1921 Railways Act, which had reorganized the companies into 

four large groups, introduced the concept of 'standard revenue' 

to the industry. This was defined as £51.4 million per year, 

equivalent to the net revenue of 1913 with no allowance for 

wartime inflation, which corresponded to a return on nominal 

capital of around 4.7%. The Act signalled the legitimacy of this 

given level of profitability, but by no means guaranteed it. Any 

excess profits were intended for return to customers, in the 

ratio of 80/20 in their favour, through price cuts. The only 

definite implication of any shortfall was that the new 

regulatory body, the Railway Rates Tribunal, would be willing to 

sanction an increase in charges. The option was available in 

practice only if competitive pressures allowed it. In actuality, 

the norm was never achieved. Excluding the General Strike year 

of 1926, net railway revenue varied between £26 million and 

nearly £45 million between 1921 and 1939. Profitability was 

clearly lower than had been anticipated by the legislators in 

1921, or indeed by anyone else. 
	
	The reasons were multiple. In part they were attributable 

to the rapid growth of road competition. A further cause was the 

generally depressed state of the heavy industries, for whose 

freight the railways still had little serious competition. 

Interacting with these factors was the regulatory system, which 

weighed much more heavily on railway companies than on road 

hauliers or bus operators. The main problem was no longer 

inability to raise prices, as this strategy was usually ruled 

out by the risk of loss of traffic. But formidable handicaps 

remained. These included the obligation to act as a common 

carrier, to publish their rates, to avoid undue preference 

(selective discounts) and to charge according to the value of 

each commodity rather than the cost of handling it. This made it 

difficult to prevent road hauliers from 'skimming the cream' - 

taking higher value merchandise traffic and leaving lower-margin 

bulk freight to the railways. Road transport was not required to 

finance its infrastructure, had no commitments to trade unions 

and was completely unregulated until the introduction of a 

licensing system for passenger services (1930) and freight 

(1933). Even then, no restrictions were placed on the 'C' 

licences (traders' own vehicles) which posed the greatest threat 

to the railways. Despite some swing in the regulatory balance 

from 1929 onwards, the railway companies were still pressing for 

a level playing field in the form of a 'square deal', meaning 

the removal of remaining restrictions on pricing, at the 

outbreak of war in 1939. It was this combination of a sluggish 

economy, a powerful new mode of transport and an increasingly 

anachronistic system of regulation which guaranteed that the 

railways would experience financial difficulties throughout the 

interwar years. The problems faced by the companies in paying 







Railway policy on dividends and reserves


The railway companies followed a policy of paying out 'earnings 

up to the hilt' (Economist, 1931). Between 1921 and 1939, net 

railway revenue totalled just over £600 million. The interest 

and dividend payments on capital, however, amounted to £760 

million, representing about 70% of the nominal capitalization 

(Railway Returns, 1921-39). Agency theorists could attempt to 

justify these payments as the railways were a mature industry 

and so managers 'with substantial free cash flow can increase 

dividends or repurchase stock and thereby pay out current cash 

that would otherwise be invested in low-return projects or 

wasted' (Jensen, 1986: 324). The railway companies did not, 

however, have substantial free cash flow as defined by Jensen 

['cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects that 

have positive net present values when discounted at the relevant 

cost of capital'(1986: 323)]. Thus, in order to finance their 

payments, the companies used some non-railway earnings, but the 

majority of the shortfall was covered by running down reserves. 

This was particularly noticeable in the 1920s, when the railway 

companies drew heavily on their £60 million wartime compensation 

to finance interest and dividend payments. Table 1 illustrates 

the depletion of reserves by £36,056,000 between 1921 and 1926. 






	 This had several consequences. It deprived the railways of 





business, while reducing interest receipts as investments were 

realised. Interest receipts fell from their peak of £4.3 million 

in 1923 to £1.48 million in 1932. This policy enabled the 

railway companies to maintain dividend payments in the short 

run, but reductions were only postponed and not prevented. The 

Economist, though favourable to railway stockholders, 

nevertheless concluded that the policy of financing dividend 

payments by running down reserves had been 'most unfortunate' 

(1929). Table 2 shows  that reserves as a proportion of 











The railway capital structure was increasingly problematic as 

demonstrated in table 3.






The table shows it was top-heavy, as it was very highly 

geared, with fixed-interest securities representing 75% of the 

capital. This meant that the railway companies, faced with 

declining profitability, found it difficult to maintain payments 

to ordinary shareholders. The average return on nominal capital 

of around 4.7%, implied by  'standard revenue',  was never 

achieved. At the low point of the depression, in 1932, the 

return fell to 2.59%. In 1937, the peak of the recovery, the 

returns were 3.9% for debentures, 3.8% for guaranteed and 

preference stock, and only 1.46% for ordinary stock. Further, in 

the depression years of the early 1930s, over £300 million of 

railway capital went without dividends (Crompton, 1989: 79). The 

contents of table 4 reveal the direction of dividend and 





					TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
	

	Table 4 shows  there was a decline in both total payments 

and in the proportion going to ordinary shareholders. The latter 

declined from 23% in 1927 to only 7% in 1934. The structure of 

railway capital meant that ordinary shareholders of all the 

companies had 'an awkward fence to cross'(Economist, 1931). 

This 'fence' applied not just to junior stockholders, 

however, but to the railway companies as a whole. For the 

capital structure increasingly represented a barrier to the 

railway companies, as it necessitated rising fixed-interest 












Accounting practices of the railway companies


The 'fence' faced by the railway companies was made harder to 

cross by the accounting practices employed in the nineteenth and 

twentieth centuries. There were several aspects to this. 

Firstly, there was the legacy of the practices from the previous 

century. Throughout the nineteenth century, as Edwards (1985: 

252) argued, 'there existed a widespread presumption that, 

provided the fixed assets of railway companies were properly 

looked after, they possessed an unlimited physical life...' Some 

experiments with crediting provisions for the depreciation of 

railway track to balance sheet funds were undertaken, but 'soon 

abandoned in favour of charging current expenditure on renewals 

and maintenance against revenue' (Edwards, 1985: 255). According 

to Pollins (1956: 347), the abandonment of depreciation 

accounting was largely motivated by the aim of relieving the 

revenue account of depreciation charges so that 'dividends could 

be more easily maintained'. The result of these practices was 

that, during the last quarter of the century, railway companies 

were increasingly criticised for their failures to depreciate 

fixed assets and to retain profits for future expansion 

(Edwards, 1985: 261). 

	By the turn of the twentieth century, however, railway 

companies began voluntarily to make provisions for depreciation

as it became evident 'that no amount of maintenance could 

prolong indefinitely the useful life of fixed assets' (Edwards, 

1985: 261). This change in practice was reflected in the 1911 

Act regulating railway accounts which, unlike the 1868 Act, 

established a method for dealing with depreciation through the 

use of renewal funds in the balance sheet (Newton, 1930: 9).

This treatment of expenditure on maintenance and renewals of 

fixed assets differed from the practices of ordinary commercial 

concerns, where the general approach was to charge renewals 

expenditure directly to the revenue account with the 

corresponding double entry being a credit to the renewals fund 

in the capital account. In the case of railway companies, 

however, the expenditure on renewals had first to be debited to 

the appropriate expenditure item, the adjustment between actual 

expenditure and the annual renewals provision being made by a 

transfer to or from the renewals fund. If the actual net 

expenditure on renewals exceeded the renewals provision, then a 

transfer from the renewals fund was made to the profit and loss 

account. On the other hand, if the actual net expenditure on 

renewals were less than the renewals provision, then a transfer 





	Faced with declining profitability, and anxious to maintain 

their dividend payments, the railway companies aimed to reduce 

expenditure on maintenance and renewals and wage costs. 

Maintenance and renewals expenditure was a prime target for 

reductions, but the treatment of such expenditure meant 

that the railway accounts were 'highly complicated' (Economist, 

1928) and difficult to interpret; apparent 'reductions' in 

expenditure which boosted net revenue were often exaggerated. 

Between 1930 and 1931, for example, expenditure on 

maintenance of way and works by the four railway companies 

apparently fell from £21,134,705 to £19,427,126, a 'fall' of 

£1.7 million. However, the transfer from renewal funds more than 

doubled from £1,018,018 in 1930 to £2,073,931 in 1931, and so 

the net expenditure reduction was only £651,666. Further, the 

GWR actually increased maintenance expenditure on way and works 

in 1931 by £62,081 to £3,941,210, but £725,970 of this 

expenditure was met from renewal funds against £256,565 in 1930. 

The net effect, therefore, was a 'reduction' of £407,324 

(Railway Returns, 1931: 13 & 32).

	While the exaggerated expenditure reductions shown in the 

revenue account stemmed partly from accounting practices the 

railways were obliged to follow, there is evidence that the 

companies also indulged in creative accounting on occasions. 

Between 1930 and 1931, for example, the renewal funds of the 

SR were increased retrospectively from £3.6 million to £5.2 

million, an increase of over 40%. There was 'an element of 

mystery' here, which was not explained in the accounts, but 

hinted at by the SR chairman's AGM speech which mentioned that 

the life of certain assets had been extended (Economist, 1933). 

Presumably, this enabled SR to write back maintenance provisions 

and to show greater economies in future as maintenance 

expenditure would be spread over longer asset lives. The 

Economist (1933) called for more information to be revealed, 

noting with understatement that 'changes in accounting can make 

a considerable difference to net profits'.   

	The net revenue figure reported in railway accounts was 

further distorted by the 'betterment' treatment adopted by the 

companies. When railway companies replaced obsolete equipment, 

the revenue account was supposed to be charged with the cost 

of replacing the equipment. If the new asset were an improvement 

on the old - a more powerful locomotive, for example - then the 

'betterment' was supposed to be charged to capital and not 

revenue. The Economist (1938b) argued that a more conservative 

approach, which would be adopted by ordinary industries, would 

be to treat the 'betterment' as a revenue charge. The result of 

the railway practice was therefore not only to inflate the 

net revenue figures shown in the railway accounts, but also to 

require injections of fresh capital if there were to be 'any 

improvement in the average standard of railway equipment' 

(Crompton, 1995: 134). Had the net revenue allowed for 

significant allocations of funds to reserves, alongside interest 

and dividend payments, then there would have been no problem. 

In practice, however, revenue was benefiting at the expense of 

capital, interest and dividend payments consumed net railway 






















The investment performance of the railway companies


Despite their revenue problems, the railway companies were able 

to increase investment in the 1920s and 1930s. It was noted that 

a 'substantial increase in capital investment' took place 

between 1929 and 1937, the two peak years for the railways in 

the interwar period (Economist, 1938a). Total capital investment 

rose by £41 million, with £27.3 million invested in railway 

assets. This investment, and the ways in which it was financed, 

nevertheless revealed fundamental weaknesses. Table 5 shows the 













As the table reveals, the overall increase in investment was  

3.6% from 1929 to 1937. There was a significant difference 

between the two types of investment, however, with non-railway 

investment increasing by 7.9%, but investment in the 

core business increasing by only 2.9%.  By 1932, the railway 

companies had invested over £8 million in acquiring shares 

in bus companies. One bus in three outside London was railway-

owned (Railway Returns, 1932: 134; Fox, 1935: 10).  
	
	Funds for investment were severely limited. Thus, any 

investment in non-railway assets carried a significant 

opportunity cost unless it increased traffic on the railways. 

Nevertheless, the railway companies could defend diversification  
given that, docks apart, railway investment was generally the 

least profitable. This position is revealed in the following 

table, which includes the peak years of 1929 and 1937, and the 











The table shows that all the railway groupings had a declining 

rate of return on their core capital expenditure over the period 

1929 to 1938. The LNER suffered the biggest fall in this respect 

- from 4.3% to 2.1%. Hotels and steamboats also suffered from 

declining rates of return, but were still generally more 

profitable than the core investments. In 1938, for example, the 

return on hotel investment was more than twice that on railway 

investment for three out of the four railway companies.
	
	The sources of investment also highlight significant 

financial weaknesses. Of the £41 million net expenditure on new 

investment in the period 1929 to 1937, only £15 million was 

raised from the issue of new capital. This was over a period, as 

one commentator noted, which included a new issue boom, both for 

fixed interest stocks and industrial securities, and so 

emphasised the inability of the railways to finance capital 

expenditure in the conventional way (Economist, 1938b). As a 

consequence, railway companies resorted to sources other than 

the capital market to finance investment. These included loans 

from government bodies such as the Railway Finance Corporation, 

land sales, the realisation of non-railway investments, and the 

use of liquid surpluses in superannuation funds. Such short-term 

expedients only exacerbated the financial position of the 

railways, making the 'fence' even harder to cross. The use  of 

superannuation funds, for example, created a hidden prior charge 

in the railway accounts, as surplus funds were invested in the 

railway companies rather than externally. Thus there was a net 

deterioration in the interest position on the funds between 1929 

and 1938 of £2.78 million. Further, the deficit on capital 

account increased from £47.4 million in 1929 to £82.5 million in 

1938 (Economist, 1938a), as capital expended increasingly 

exceeded capital raised on the market.  
   	    
	A further problem, which is examined in the next section, 

was that any investment could be problematic, as railway 

directors were under pressure from shareholders to devote 












Management and shareholder attitudes to capital expenditure 

The decline in profitability after 1929 had obvious negative 

implications for everyone with a stake in the railways  - 

directors and managers, shareholders and employees. Even 

customers, although benefiting in the short term from the 

inability of the companies to raise charges to a more rewarding 

level, were likely to suffer from consequential lack of 

development of services. A combination of embarrassment and 

indignation was a predictable response to the clearly inadequate 

profits of the 1930s. Embarrassment was caused by the undeniable 

evidence of poor commercial performance and impaired ability to 

raise new equity; indignation by the failure to achieve even the 

'standard revenue' which seemed a legitimate entitlement. 

However, the circumstances of these years opened up a gap 

between the perceptions of directors and senior management on 

the one hand and of the ordinary stockholders on the other.

	Dividend policy posed little challenge to consensus between 

management and shareholders. The understandable desire to 

maintain trustee status for the ordinary stock  [that is, stock 

which trustees were able to invest in as it paid a minimum 

annual dividend of 3% (Newton, 1930: 17)] was a shared motive. 

This affected both the general reputation of a railway 

company as a custodian of investors' funds, and also any future 

attempts to raise capital in the form of ordinary shares, as 

opposed to fixed interest securities. These considerations often 

influenced  decisions to make uncovered dividend payments, and 





times might be around the corner. An LMSR stockholder at the 

1934 annual meeting expressed qualified satisfaction that the 

directors had succeeded in finding an additional £650,000 for 

dividends 'after the worst year in the history of the United 

Kingdom' (Railway Gazette, 1934a).  The chairman of the GWR, Sir 

Robert Horne, explained to his annual meeting in the same year 

that a 3% dividend would be maintained because 'the ordinary 

shareholder was entitled in bad times to benefit from the free 

reserves which have been built up in more normal times to meet 

just such a set of circumstances as the present' (Railway 

Gazette, 1934b). By then the GWR was the only one of the big 

four to have retained full trustee status for its ordinary 

stock. As a stockholders' spokesman indicated a few months 

later, the immediate reason for this was plain.  In 1933 over 

£311 million of railway preference and ordinary stock had gone 

without dividend (and a further £208 million of preference stock 

received an incomplete payment), whereas the corresponding 

figure for 1930 had been only around £36 million (Railway 

Gazette, 1934c). Two years later, the same GWR chairman defended 

another decision, which he admitted was reached only after 

hesitation, to pay an uncovered 3% dividend. On this occasion he 

produced a statement of social and ideological solidarity with 

the small shareholders. They were, he claimed, 'people of modest 

means whose holding in our company represents the savings of a 

lifetime of thrift and constitutes their main defence against 

the disabilities of old age and the slings and arrows of 

misfortune' (Railway Gazette, 1936a). Even when boards felt 

unable to make payments on the ordinary stock, they were willing 

to acknowledge the legitimacy of such entitlements. The LMSR 

chairman in 1935 remarked that capital was 'most inadequately 

remunerated' (Railway Gazette, 1935a).

	Managers and shareholders shared the same perspective on 

the need to protect net revenue by cutting costs. Here there was 

much to applaud - what a well-informed source called 'the 

magnificent achievements of the management in effecting 

permanent economies' (Railway Gazette, 1934d). All four 

companies took pride in the fact that declining receipts in the 

difficult years since 1929 had been partly compensated by 

substantial expenditure reductions. The LMSR reported in 1935 

that revenue was down by 17% since 1929, but costs had also been 

cut by 13% (Railway Gazette, 1935a).  An important facilitating 

factor in these economies had been mentioned twelve months 

earlier, when it was pointed out that staff had been reduced by 

20% over the previous ten years (Railway Gazette, 1935a). These 

successes in economizing were not normally taken for granted 

during hard times on the railways because many costs were 

assumed to be fixed, and could not be expected to decline in 

sympathy with falling traffic. It is probable that the drive to 

control expenditure during the early 1930s partly depended on 

the continuing process of integration and rationalization which 

had been under way since the massive amalgamations of 1923. 

Although little route mileage was closed, there were still 

opportunities for gradual standardization and the elimination of 

duplication and waste. The LMSR, the largest of the groups and 

the most effectively centralised in terms of management control, 


was perhaps best placed to enjoy the fruits of amalgamation. In 

the early 1930s, the company introduced a system of budgetary 

control 'as a means of controlling and rationing working 

expenditure' (Railway Gazette, 1936b). Managerial and 

shareholder opinion was closest on the subject of rationalizing 

economies which were intended to establish a permanently lower 





	On other matters too, the gap between managers and 

stockholders was not usually great. The main issue in collective 

bargaining between the companies and unions in this period was 

over the feasibility of restoring pay to the level of early 

1931, before the cuts of almost 5% which were agreed in that 

year. An attempt by the companies to impose further reductions 

of just over 5% in 1932-33 was unsuccessful and led to a 

temporary breakdown of the bargaining machinery. Owners and 

managers generally took the view that there was no justification 

for full restoration of the pay cuts until there had been a 

proportionate recovery in profits. The employers' representative 

at the National Wages Board in December 1932 had emphasized as 

his most important argument 'justice to the shareholders.' In 

stressing the 'ability to pay' factor the companies were 

prepared to describe themselves as 'a vital industry stricken to 

the point of exhaustion.'   Despite the failure to reduce wages 

below the 1931 level, the employers' tough stance succeeded in 

ensuring that pay rose considerably more slowly than prices 

during the  recovery of 1933 to 1937 (Crompton, 1989: 71-8). The 

most vigorous assertions emanated from shareholder interests. At 

the 1935 annual meeting of the British Railway Stockholders' 

Union (BSRU), one member characteristically complained 'that he 

did not think the fact that railways were the property of 

stockholders was always fully realised in high quarters', and 

then denounced the assumption that 'the first consideration of a 





	Shareholder enthusiasm for economies clearly outstripped 

that of management. It tended to regard any avoidable 

expenditure as unjustified and detrimental to profitability and, 

therefore, to the railways' capacity to pay dividends. Specific 

investment plans were repeatedly queried or opposed by 

stockholders who believed that the restoration of dividends to 

adequate levels should have absolute priority over spending 

proposals. A typical protest was the demand at the 1936 LMSR 

annual meeting that the £5 million reconstruction of Euston 

Station, the company's London headquarters, should be postponed 

until ordinary shareholders had received some dividend (Railway 

Gazette, 1936c).  Attacking on a broader front, a speaker at the 

GWR meeting in the same year wondered how capital expenditure of 

£30 million by the four groups over the past five years could 

possibly be justified, pointing out that the annual interest 

payable on loans of that size would be £750,000 (Railway 

Gazette, 1936d). The management perspective on both these issues 

was quite different. The LMSR chairman, Sir Josiah Stamp, judged 

that the new Euston House headquarters building would allow 

'efficiency and economy of co-ordination of work.' The 

replanning of the terminus would give the company 'much greater 

operating efficiency' for both passenger and parcels trains. 

Such a scheme, enabling greater traffic to be handled with no 

extra cost, or the existing traffic with a reduced cost, 'would 

come within the field of improved net revenue at no very distant 

date' (Railway Gazette, 1935c).  For the GWR, Sir Robert Horne's 

reply to his critic was even more forceful. If the questioner 

were correct, he asserted, there would be no advance, no capital 

expenditure, and no new capital. 'Surely', he asked 

rhetorically, 'that would mean a moribund railway?' He had 

already told the meeting, in similar vein, 'obviously we cannot 

stand still' (Railway Gazette, 1936e).  

	When cornered by hostile questioning of this sort, and 

obliged to defend their past actions and current policies, 

railway leaders had no option but to express their differences 

with shareholders. Yet there is no doubt that they were 

sensitive to any suggestion that they were neglecting 

shareholder interests by over-spending or by ignoring 

opportunities for trimming costs. On another occasion when Stamp 

was addressing shareholders, he began by observing that 'the 

cardinal principle of undertaking new capital expenditure must 

always be the improvement and maintenance of net revenue.' He 

then differentiated among various types of capital schemes. Some 

were intended to raise gross revenue, some to protect existing 

gross revenue, and others to earn it at smaller cost. He 

conceded that there was a further category, not immediately 

relevant to the three main purposes, namely those which 'were 

necessary to meet reasonable public demands', such as passenger 

amenities in trains and stations (Railway Gazette, 1935c). This 

was later described by his Vice-President as 'the process of 

keeping abreast of the times' (Railway Gazette, 1936b). Stamp 

had previously registered awareness of this consideration, when 

he admitted to the 1935 annual meeting that 'we have let 

decorative work get shabby at various places', though not, he 

had quickly added, 'where that would cause a greater ultimate 

outlay' (Railway Gazette, 1935a).

	On the main theme, Stamp and Wood stressed that every 

project was expected 'to show a reasonably clear margin after 

allowing for the interest and other charges' (Railway Gazette, 

1936b).   Furthermore, the LMSR not only estimated the costs of 

a scheme 'in great detail', but also sent the figures to be 

'overhauled by the accountant's department, so that they knew in 

advance how much would be chargeable to renewal funds, to 

current revenue and to new capital outlay.' If all these 

procedures were correctly followed, then there was no basis for 

the common suspicion that capital or reconstruction expenditure 

was 'putting money in front of the rights of the ordinary 

shareholders.' Those who insisted that nothing should be spent 

on the railway until their dividends were paid ought to realise 

that 'a railway concern was growing and contracting in all 

directions and that future dividends depended on judicious 

outlay' (Railway Gazette, 1935c). Wood similarly emphasized that 

the LMSR budgetary control system, although 'an invaluable aid 

in rationing the available money on its merits', was 'not a mere 

expenditure cutting arrangement.' On the contrary, in selected 

areas, such as signalling, advertizing and mechanical office 

equipment, increased expenditure has been authorized as a matter 

of central policy' (Railway Gazette, 1936b).  Furthermore the 

company had over the past seven years secured 'a clear economy' 

of £2 million a year in real terms, on a like-for-like basis, in 

the cost of building, running and repairing its locomotives 

(Railway Gazette, 1935c).  The total number of locomotives had 

been reduced by 24% since 1923, but expenditure had been 

required in order to reorganize the workshops and to introduce 

new locomotive designs (Railway Gazette, 1936b). 
	
	Thus the management's principal line of reassurance to 

shareholders was that some expenditure was essential, even to 

obtain permanent working economies, but that it was always 

undertaken sparingly and with a finely calculated prudential 

rigour, with the improvement of net revenue as the criterion. 
  
Stamp and Wood were also anxious to counter the charge that 

'capital was always being added to, but never pruned' (Railway 

Gazette, 1935c).  In fact the big four had together since 1924 

enjoyed credits to capital for assets displaced and not replaced 

which totalled £25 million (Railway Gazette, 1936b). On the LMSR 

over the past three years there had been a reduction of £1 

million in expenditure on the capital account (Railway Gazette, 

1935c). Whether capital expenditure was undertaken or avoided, 

management was focused on the reduction of costs. Between 1922 

and 1935 the four groups cut working expenses by a gross amount 

of £45 million (Railway Gazette, 1936b). This sum was not 

equivalent to true economies as it included the results of 


changes in prices and output and made no allowance for increased 

interest charges incurred, but was nevertheless impressive. It 

was the knowledge that the LMSR had developed the organizational 

capacity to increase its efficiency in this way that allowed its 

chairman to proclaim that the company 'as a unit, as a machine, 

as a living organism is a better one than at any time in its 

history' (Railway Gazette, 1936f).  Yet, as Stamp himself had 

reminded the 1935 LMSR annual meeting, it was only through 

growth in gross revenue that any striking improvement in profits 

could be attained (Railway Gazette, 1935a).  

	The LNER's approach to capital expenditure  showed marked 

similarities to that of the LMSR. A review of activities in 1934 

presented to the 1935 annual meeting included a reference to 

'some anxiety' felt by shareholders about the company's spending 

plans. Between 1923 and 1934, 1,543 schemes had cost £4,774,000, 

resulting in annual cost savings of £1,052,000 and annual 

revenue gains of £190,000. The return on expenditure was thus 

26%. It added, significantly, that 'the most obvious schemes 

were, of course, taken in hand first of all', and that, those 

carried out in the past two years had yielded almost 17% 

(Railway Gazette, 1935d).  The implication is that the company 

tried hard to confine its capital expenditure to projects of 

modest size which would produce a high proportionate return, 

which consisted primarily of savings in cost rather than 

increases in revenue. The overall return on the company's 

capital investment remained low.

	The kind of capital investment with the greatest potential 

for raising revenue was, of course, electrification. One of the 

four groups, the SR, had been proceeding on this assumption for 

some time, and the brightest passages in the record of railway 

activities in the 1930s are the reports of the continuing 

success of the SR's electrification strategy. This  'progressive 

and courageous policy' in circumstances of depression was 

applauded at the 1934 annual meeting as the reason why a 

dividend had been possible on the preferred ordinary stock in 

both the current and the previous year (Railway Gazette, 1934f). 

The SR was at this time 'the only important railway company in 

the world to pay a dividend on any class of ordinary capital 

entirely from profits actually earned during the preceding year' 

(Railway Gazette, 1935e). The 1934 meeting also heard that 

2,200,000 additional passengers had been carried, 600,000 on the 

London-Brighton line alone (Railway Gazette, 1934g). In 1935 it 

was reported that out of 13.6 million extra passengers, 11 

million had travelled on the electrified sections of the 

company's routes (Railway Gazette, 1935f). 

	The impressive results of electrification and its 

contribution to the SR's recovery are well-known and 

uncontentious. The lack of progress in this direction of the 

other three larger companies probably requires more attention. 

There were, of course, good reasons why the SR might have had a 

stronger predisposition towards electric traction than its 

contemporaries. These were the relatively prosperous nature of 

the territory served by the SR, its high dependence on 

passenger as opposed to freight traffic, and the large 

size of its suburban operations. Nevertheless, the 

other three railway companies are still open to the charge that 

reluctance to invest resulted in missed opportunities. A general 

programme of electrification had been recommended in 1931 for 

all Britain's railways by the Weir Committee, which had 

predicted a gross return of just under 7%. The Weir report 

failed to stimulate electrification, partly because of the 

exceptionally unfavourable timing of its publication, and partly 

because of the unrealistic assumptions on which its cost-benefit 

calculations were based. The latter consideration also applied 

to regional studies commissioned by Weir and later by the GWR. 

Weir made no allowance for any acceleration of services or 

increase in demand: the estimated benefits related solely to 

economies in handling existing traffic. In fact wherever 

electrification took place, there were more passengers. Only 

modest reductions were assumed in the number of locomotive units 

in use. The supply of both electricity and capital were costed 

at levels which were soon shown to be excessively high. It was 

also obvious that more limited schemes, focused on routes where 

traffic was relatively dense, would have yielded much higher 

returns in practice than were implied by the Weir exercise which 

envisaged a comprehensive twenty year national conversion 

programme. Electrification was not appropriate everywhere, but 

could undoubtedly have increased the gains in suburban and long-

distance passenger traffic which were made by the interwar 





	In 1935 the LMSR, the largest of the groups, had only 117 

route miles (282 track miles) electrified. These had been 

developed over the previous 32 years, in some cases by the 

LMSR's predecessor companies, at a cost of about £11 million. 

Stamp told the 1935 meeting that 'close consideration' had 

recently been given to both main line and suburban 

electrification, but that there was little chance of further 

large-scale expenditure in the near future. This indicated a 

clear decision not to follow the path taken by the SR. Stamp 

made some attempt to justify this position. He reminded his 

audience that there was an obligation to convince the Railway 

Rates Tribunal, the statutory body with regulatory powers over 

the railways, that the LMSR was practising 'efficient and 

economical working.' Any expenditure which did not meet 

commercial criteria could not be justified in this context. He 

also stressed that if any new works failed to pay their way in 

due course, then the burden would fall on railway users, 

proprietors or employees. Road building, in complete contrast, 

did not have to pass such tests or to face such risks (Railway 

Gazette, 1935g).  All this was true, but it was the stuff of 

cliche rather than of fresh reasoning. It was, of course, 

applicable to any possible new spending projects, not just to 

electrification. The missing factor in Stamp's presentation of 

the issue was the financial scale of electrification. Weir had 

talked of investment of £260 million by the railways over a 

twenty year period (plus £80 million by the Central Electricity 

Board and others)  (Crompton, 1995: 126-8).  The overall state 

of railway finances makes it easy to understand why directors 

might well flinch in the face of such challenges, even though 

many possible electrification schemes would undoubtedly have 

passed the rigorous LMSR investment procedures. It seems 

implausible that men such as Stamp and Wood, who were so proud 

of their company's innovating practice in many other areas, 

would have been prejudiced against electrification by reason of 

technological or organizational conservatism. It was financial 

factors which ensured that their innovating zeal would be 





	As the weakest of the big four in financial terms, the LNER 

found the capital requirements of electrification particularly 

intimidating. Its general manager, Sir Ralph Wedgwood, who also 

served on the Central Electricity Board, had been a member of 

the Weir committee, but had acted as a negative influence, 

having secured a watering-down of the more positive first draft 

of the report. He was also on record as believing that 

'expectation of a 10% return was demanded before new works were 

regarded as justifiable' (Crompton, 1995: 129-31). When the 

chairman, William Whitelaw, told the 1935 annual meeting that 

they were not in favour of wholesale electrification, he gave 

pleasure to many shareholders. One dissident, however, who 

distanced himself from the BSRU lobby, expressed 'extreme 

disappointment' over the company's lack of interest in 

conversion of the suburban lines out of the Liverpool Street 

terminus. He identified this as the biggest issue facing the 

LNER, and argued that 'the longer the directors evaded it, the 

worse it would be for the company, the stockholders and the 

public.' To his mind, 'if there was one place in the world where 

electrification was certain to pay and where it was most needed, 

it was Liverpool Street' (Railway Gazette, 1935h).  The 

chairman's response referred to the fact that the matter was no 

longer in the hands of the LNER alone but rather of the London 

Transport Joint Committee. This body did eventually address the 

question of Liverpool Street-Shenfield electrification but with 

little impact before World War II.  Whitelaw conceded 'severe 

overcrowding at rush hours', but argued that the lines to 

Shenfield were already fully loaded and that expensive track 

widening would be needed to overcome this problem, in addition 

to the normal costs associated with electrification. The total 

expenditure of at least £7 million meant that the conversion 

'could not be other than a losing proposition, which the 

financial circumstances of the company did not allow them to 

undertake.' He somewhat weakened this case by pointing out that 

the LNER had provided new steam trains, had spent more than £1 

million on widening track between Romford and Shenfield, and had 

achieved a 13% increase in suburban mileage since 1922. Yet 

another factor inhibiting electrification was concern about 

competition by road and tube. Whitelaw remarked significantly 

that 'the absence of a pool of competing interests and of 

substantial government assistance' had been a major factor 

in reaching such a conclusion (Railway Gazette, 1935i).

	Despite the railway companies' proud claims to independence 

and self-subsistence, government assistance had in fact been 

available for some years, and was a further subject on which 

management and shareholders often differed. Under the 

Development (Loan Guarantees and Grants) Act of 1929 just over 

£30 million was raised for railway investment, and the Railway 

Finance Corporation Loan Act of 1935 produced £40 million for 

London and £26 million elsewhere. Neither scheme amounted to 

straightforward direct subsidy. The terms of the former were 

that the companies financed new works themselves, but the 

government then provided grants to cover part of the interest 

payments for periods of up to fifteen years. Under the latter 

the government guaranteed the principal and the interest on 

loans which the companies were able to raise at lower rates than 

normal (Railway Gazette, 1935j & 1935k).  Apart from the public 

concern to reduce unemployment, the rationale was that railways 

would be enabled to implement projects more quickly, and would 

be compensated for the loss of interest suffered in the interval 

before the investment became fully remunerative. By 1935 

ordinary interest rates were substantially lower than in 1929 

and there were frequent references to the desirability of taking 

advantage of the current cheapness of borrowing before the 

situation changed. GWR annual meetings were given some details 

of the benefits of these state initiatives. In 1934 the 

company's capital expenditure included £1,620,675 for works 

approved under the 1929 Act, with a further £757,000 scheduled 

for the current year. The cumulative figure was then £5,395,700, 

and 31 out of 35 approved schemes had been completed, with 

reference being made to works at Paddington, Bristol and Cardiff 

and to re-equipping the South Wales docks so as to handle 20-ton 

wagons. The government grant, it was said, 'goes a long way 

towards meeting the interest charges' (Railway Gazette, 1934h). 

In 1935 it was reported that 40 schemes had been completed under 

the 1929 Act (Railway Gazette, 1935l).

	The shareholder view of such co-operation between 

government and railways was often sour and suspicious. It feared 

that the government was helping itself and the unemployed more 

than the railways. The ultimate nightmare was that the railways 

might be pressurized into some financially disastrous programme 

of widespread electrification. A worried stockholder at the 1935 

GWR annual meeting, referring to recent advocacy of 

electrification by Lloyd George, generalized his phobias by 

complaining about 'a growing tendency on the part of politicians 

to regard the railway companies as a current asset for the 

furtherance of political propaganda', whereas the truth was that 

'the only people with the right to give decisions were the 

stockholders, by whom the railways were owned' (Railway Gazette, 

1935m). At the 1935 LNER meeting another disgruntled shareholder 

claimed, in respect of electrification proposals, that 'this was 

now being made a political move and the railways had been for 

too long in latter years the plaything of the government and 

politicians' (Railway Gazette, 1936d). A year later the GWR 

meeting heard an eloquent and embittered denunciation of the 

1935 Act. A BSRU spokesman thought the government guarantee 

might be 'giving a hostage to the state'. The railways would be 

spending money unnecessarily whereas the government's guarantee 

'would probably never cost it a halfpenny, but it had 

nonetheless acquired the right to meddle with the future of the 

railways'. The root of the problem was the government's wish to 

help employment and the need of the banks to assist industries 

to which they had lent money. He concluded that 'in this matter 

the railway companies had become a kind of charitable 

organisation but it was the stockholders who would find the 

charitable funds' (Railway Gazette, 1936d). 

	Railway leaders like Stamp went to some lengths to distance 

themselves from both this interpretation and from the opposite 

charge that the railways had become excessively 'public 

assistance-minded' and had asked the government for charity for 

themselves. At the BRSU in 1935 he dismissed 'the idea that they 

were merely passive agents of external policy with subordinate 

regard to their own economic interests', and denied any 

intention of 'acting as philanthropists, mainly for electoral 

purposes' (Railway Gazette, 1935c). He used his accustomed 

argument that the companies had simply taken advantage of 

favourable conditions  to make sound and carefully calculated 

investments. On other occasions Stamp rejected the notion, 

advanced by Herbert Morrison and others, that the railways had 

relied excessively on government help. This time he claimed that 

the railways had been assisted only in the implementation of 

projects outside their normal programmes, those insufficiently 

profitable to justify the use of ordinary funds (Crompton, 1995: 

132-4). Such arguments provided a response to criticisms, but 

could not conceal some fundamental facts about the railways' 












Railway over-capitalization and the decline in earning power 


The weakening financial position of the railways revived by the 

mid 1930s the old debate as to whether the industry was over-

capitalized. The companies had attempted, with some success, to 

refute charges that capital was 'watered', but found it more 

difficult to deal with critics who focused on both capital and 

earning problems. Charges that the existing capital could not 

have been raised in the climate of the 1930s, because of a 

permanent decline in earning power, were carried by leading 

financial journals. The Economist (1938b) argued that the 

problem of raising capital was likely to 'become acute', and so 

proposed a capital reorganization whereby the share capital of 

the railways would be 'reduced to a nominal value justified by 

current earnings'. The Accountant (1932) emphasized the fact 

that net revenue fell in the 1930s to around two-thirds of 

'standard revenue', and saw no hope of regaining pre-war 

earnings without a return to 'pre-war trade levels'. Such 

articles, and the letters they drew in response, stung railway 

directors into staunch defences of their position. Stamp, for 

example, was anxious to rebut the charge that the railways were 

over-capitalized, and so required a capital reorganization. A 

standard response was that much of the accumulated railway 

assets stood at pre-war prices, which understated the true value 

and the replacement cost. Stamp's estimate was that the 

replacement cost was 146% of the nominal capitalization (1932). 

	 Stamp was, of course, an accomplished controversialist, 

adept at responding to criticisms from shareholders and external 

critics alike. He could not, however, conceal the disturbing 

reality of the railways' position. They enjoyed a much higher 

return on their (relatively modest) recent investments in both 

core and peripheral activities, whether state-assisted or not, 

than they did on the great bulk of their capital. Government 

assistance had only ameliorated, not eliminated, serious 

difficulties in raising capital, and so the railway companies  

continued to spend more on capital than they raised and the 

'fence' of capitalization was growing into an insurmountable 

barrier. Although progress in cutting costs was 

pleasing (except to employees), three of the four groups were 

unwilling to embrace what was certainly their best chance to 

increase profits through higher revenue-namely electrification.

The consequences were apparent in net revenue figures. At the 

cyclical peak of 1937 only one of the companies reached a higher 

level than at the previous peak of 1929, and all four recorded 

a lower percentage return on capital. A renewed economic 

downturn then undermined the achievements of the recovery years, 

reducing earnings to approximately the level of the trough of 

1932 (Crompton, 1995: 124-5).

	Commentators in the financial press, who were certainly not 

hostile to either the railway companies or the stockholders, 

offered a clear, if unpalatable, solution. The Economist (1938) 

emphasized that in a normal industrial concern, 'a solution 

would doubtless be sought in a reorganization of the existing 

capital'. This argument was reinforced by The Accountant (1939) 

when it cited recent precedents for capital reduction, which 

were mostly of a greater magnitude than had been proposed for 

the railways. The examples given, which included a nominal share 

capital reduction from £1 to three pence, embraced shipping, 

iron, steel, coal, engineering and textiles. The bald conclusion 

was that 'present and prospective earning powers of the British 

railways are inadequate for the payment of any dividends on a 















































By 1939, it was clear to many observers that the 'fence' of 

railway capitalization had become a formidable barrier to the 

industry. The railways were indeed financially over-

capitalized, but increasingly physically under-capitalized, by 

the end of the interwar period. This was both because the 

capital already contained some 'water' in 1914, and because of 

the irretrievable decline in earning  capacity in the 1920s and 

1930s. The 1921 settlement had fixed a 'standard revenue' for 

the railway companies, but this was never achieved in the 

interwar period. The use of reserves to maintain dividend and 

interest payments protected shareholders for some time, but 

compromised the long run capacity  of the railways to generate 

revenue. The companies were proud of their unsubsidized status, 

but accepted indirect government assistance with employment-

creation schemes in the 1930s. Investment, however, remained 

inadequate. The best results were obtained either outside the 

core railway business or on relatively small projects which were 

incapable of significantly raising the overall rate of return. 

Most of the companies failed to respond to the opportunities 

offered by modernization in the form of electrification, 

principally because financial weakness made the high initial 

cost a formidable deterrent. All the companies sought relief 

from their problems primarily through reduction of costs rather 

than increase of revenue. This they were able to achieve by a 

combination of greater organizational efficiency and the 

continuing economies of amalgamation.  These financial ironies 

illustrate the insoluble character of the railways' problems 

within the existing structure of private ownership and public 

regulation. The same financial ironies also underlie the 

somewhat naive insight of a contributor to a contemporary 

Institute of Transport conference, who thought 'the railways had 

become obsolete, but only financially and not as a means of 









































	Table 1  Withdrawals from reserves between 1921 and 1926   	
			Year        Amounts withdrawn from reserves:     					 Government              Other    
					 compensation	
						£000			     £000
			
			1921			4,478			      306
			1922			1,153			   	   6
			1923			  848			      350
			1924			2,760		    	    2,351
			1925			4,000		    	    2,636
			1926		     5,356		   	   11,782
			Totals 	    18,625 		   17,431


			                                                 








































			Table 2   Depletion of reserve and renewal funds 	











			                                                		








































		Table 3 Railway capital structure 1939                		          Par values                                  
																																		  £million

		Debentures							    	315
		Guaranteed and cumulative preference shares  	145	   		Other preference shares				    	365
		Ordinary shares						     275	
		Total								   1,100


		                                                     













































Table 4  The trend in dividend and interest payments            

Type of payment            1927                1934            										                     		

				   £million    	   £million 	%

Debenture interest 		11.46    27		12.28	    38				    
Guaranteed dividends    	21.53    50		17.78    55     

Ordinary dividends         9.66    23 		 2.39	     7	     Totals				42.65   100		32.45	   100      

                                                                
			

































		Table 5 Railway capital expenditure 1929 and 1937     

		Type of investment   1929    1937    Increase        




		Non-railway	     	173.8	     187.5   	13.7	7.9
		Totals		   1,124.9   1,165.9      41.0 3.6

		                                                     






















































1929			4.3			 5.2		  0.8		8.1
1937			3.3			 1.7		  1.0		6.0






1929			4.95			loss		  2.7	    34.5
1937			4.2			 4.8		  1.6		9.4
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